Advances in cyber situational awareness technology lead to the creation of increasingly complex tools. Human analysts face challenges finding relevant information in large, complex data sets, when exploring data to discover patterns and insights. To be effective in identifying and defeating future cyber-attacks, cyber analysts require novel tools and models that can fill the gap between cyber data and situation comprehension. The research presented here is designed to develop a system that will warn a cyber analyst of file format endangerment that could impact cyber situational awareness. The expert system statistically determines an institutional risk profile based on collected expert knowledge in the form of risk profiles calculated by means of risk factors. The institutional risk profile indicates risks that could endanger digital content employed in analysis of cyber situational awareness. Based on the institutional risk profile, a cyber analyst can implement measures for stabilising and securing situational awareness. Each institution may have multiple risk profile definitions dependent on network, critical infrastructure, and the role of the cyber analyst. Another contribution relates to the provided support for visualisation and analysis of risk factors for individual dimensions. To facilitate decision-making, the aggregated information about the risk factors is presented as a multidimensional vector.
INTRODUCTION
The cyber Situational Awareness (SA) (Barford et al., 2010 ) is a perception of security and threat situation with current and future impact assessment. In recent years, researchers in SA field have created increasingly complex tools across many application domains. Often, tool outputs are of a complex nature, involving non-textual, high-dimensional, and various multimedia data. Designers of automated tools are aiming to address situational awareness challenges like complex and fluid system topology, rapidly changing technologies, high noise to signal ratio, rapidly evolving and multi-faceted threats, speed of events, data overload, and meaning underload (Kott and Wang, 2014) . These factors make real-time situational awareness of cyber operations very difficult to evaluate. Contrary to the human brain -which is well designed to derive situational awareness from the world based on a complex set of cognitive processes and schema learned through experience -the artificial world of cyber operations seriously stresses that process. Addressing the lack of good, integrated tools that help bridge this gap by assisting the operator with a comprehensive set of needed information is critical for developing the necessary cyber security awareness required to secure operations.
In security planning, it is necessary to analyse data that are often vague and imprecise. In cyber situational awareness, we have to rely on such imperfect information to detect real attacks and to prevent an attack from happening through appropriate risk management. Cyber SA aggregates raw data at the lower level (Barford et al., 2010) . Missing data or rendering errors can cause serious SA failure in achieving the overall goal of cyber defense.
While making a decision, a human cyber analyst faces challenges like finding relevant information in large, complex data sets and in searching data to discover patterns and insights. For humans to be effective in identifying and defeating future cyber-attacks, novel tools and models that can fill the gap between cyber data and situation comprehension are highly desired.
One of the core risk factors for situational awareness is an ability to render stored data such as log files, emails and documentation. Emails may comprise improper mime types and additional information in attachments, such as PDF and Word. System logs mostly are expected in a text form, but they can also make use of any proprietary formats. And system documentation mostly employs either pdf or web formats. Web formats can be composite documents that may contain a wide variety of other formats. This risk factor deals with the evaluation of appropriate formats used for encoding digital content. The preservation risks for a particular file format are difficult to estimate as described in (Graf and Gordea, 2013) . Since each institution has its specific Situational Awareness, the proposed system can only support decision making with its risk profiles. However, the automatically computed institutional risk profiles have to be adjusted and validated by institutional expert. The definition of risk factors and associated metrics is still an open research topic in the archiving community. Involvement of digital preservation experts is required for collecting complete information and evaluating risks as shown in (Ayris et al., 2008) .
The SA expert is dependent on rendering software and archived data that describe previous incidents, vulnerabilities and attacks. The digital preservation domain addresses the problem of long-term data archiving and can be employed in SA field to ensure data rendering. For example facing rendering problems and employing File Format Metadata Aggregator (FFMA) analyst can quickly find an alternative rendering solution, though FFMA can not prevent rendering problems.
Currently, each institution selects its own file formats for preservation depending on particular task and critical infrastructure. Due to the scale of digital information that has to be managed, institutions are facing challenges regarding preservation, maintenance, and quality assurance of stored data. For that reason, automated solutions for data management and digital preservation are absolutely necessary. Trustworthy and continued access to data encoded in all presented formats is important for further analysis and building knowledge base to support decision making in a fast-changing environment, possibly under attack. Ensuring the continued accessibility of content encoded in various file formats before an attack arises can ensure that a cyber situational operator has access to the necessary data when crisis occurs.
Many file formats are properly documented, are open-source and well supported by software vendors. Other formats may be outdated or no longer functional with modern software or hardware. There are also custom/proprietary formats -which may be obsolete and not renderable with commodity hardware.
The novelty of this technical solution is the employment of data mining methods to facilitate complex risk factor settings for cyber analysts. Our goal is to make use of a domain expert knowledge base to detect situational awareness risks for a particular institution. An automated file format endangerment warning can assist the cyber analyst to secure robust situational awareness. The research data for the expert knowledge base and factors for the risk metrics calculation were provided through two studies organised by Heather Ryan (Ryan, 2014) , . The data from the first study (Ryan, 2014) refined the factors that are employed to create the risk profiles. The short paper outlined the research methods and goals of the study that produced the data used in the test scenarios demonstrated here. This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of related work and concepts. Section 3 explains the risk factor visualisation workflow and also covers data mining issues. Section 4 presents the experimental setup, applied methods and results. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides an outlook on planned future work.
RELATED WORK
The research on risk management in SA increasingly gains in importance. The SA framework (Morita et al., 2011) describes how a person perceives elements of the environment, comprehends and projects its actions into the future. This framework employs the situation awareness model that can be used in the assessment of risk awareness focusing on the adverse event notification system. Our expert system takes a similar approach, but focuses on renderability of essential information, rather than events. The review of existing situation awareness measurement techniques for their suitability for use in the assessment of SA in different environments (Salmon et al., 2006) demonstrates that current SA measurement techniques are inadequate by themselves for use in the assessment of SA, and a multiple-measure approach utilising different approaches is recommended. To address this gap, we employ specific risk factors obtained from the archiving community for the digital content focus of SA. In security planning, it is necessary to analyse data that are often vague and imprecise. In (Barford et al., 2010) authors survey existing technologies in handling uncertainty and risk management in cyber situational awareness, but the focus is on looking for vulnerabilities in a system, whereby our approach is focused on secure rendering of the raw data at a lower level that creates a basis for fur-ther SA aspects, such as situation recognition, situation comprehension and situation projection (Barford et al., 2010) . It is difficult to guarantee the longivity of digital information. The investigation (Lawrence et al., 2000) examines risk assessment of migrating file formats. Accurate format identification and rendering is a challenging task due to malformed MIME types, rendering expenses, dependence on content not embedded in the file, changed fonts, etc. In (Jackson, 2012), the author examines how network effects can stabilise formats against obsolescence. Jackson's evaluation demonstrates that most formats last much longer than five years, that network effects stabilize formats, and that new formats appear at a modest, manageable rate. However, a number of formats are fading from use and every corpus contains its own biases. Digital preservation tools like PANIC (Hunter and Choudhury, 2006) , AONS II (Pearson and Webb, 2008) , SPOT (Vermaaten et al., 2012) , P2 registry (David Tarrant, 2011) , were designed to notify repository managers of file format-related events that might impact access to stored content. They also define alerting mechanisms when file formats become obsolete. As distinct from our approach, they do not apply expert knowledge and do not specify risk factors that may influence file format endangerment. In the proposed approach we intend to apply standard statistics and data mining methods. The proposed system is unique for the given domain.
VISUALISATION METHOD
Visualisation of risk profiles facilitates risk profile selection, assessment and replacement, if required. Each risk profile is represented by a multidimensional vector. In the presented approach 31 dimensions were evaluated and rated by the domain experts. The risk profile visualisation is conducted according the workflow shown in Fig. 1 .
The risk profile data provided by domain experts is stored in a text file. As described in the workflow reads data (step 1) and employs a data mining method that calculates distances between risk profiles based on the values of their risk factors. Domain experts rated the risk factors on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is "extremely important," and 5 is "not at all important." To remove a possible mismatch of scale between the features and have a possibly wellbalanced risk factor r f set, the workflow applies normalisation in the second step.
Normalisation employs the modified standard score (MSS) (Tanner, 2012; Zacharski, 2012 ) (see Formula 1), which prevents the influence of the outliers. Each risk profile column is normalised separately. The modified standard score demonstrates how big the deviation from the median value M is. First the median value for each column is calculated. The median is a middle value from the list, arranged from lowest to highest value. Then, based on the median, the absolute standard deviation can be calculated. In the third step, computed risk factors are visualised for a given dimension. For example, one such dimension is the relation between institutional and expert risk profiles.
Finally, a cyber analyst should analyse the resulting plot in the context of a particular SA task. The calculation of the nearest risk profile is described in the workow shown in Fig. 2 . The risk profile data collected from domain experts is stored in a text file and is used in the classification task. The institutional risk profile that comprises the most important factors for the institution settings is stored in an additional file. The workflow execution starts with the reading of both input files. Input risk profiles are stored in the data model classifier and are converted in risk profile vectors in the second step. Applying the cosine similarity algorithm (Dehak et al., 2010) , (Ye, 2011) we find the nearest risk profile from the expert knowledge base. In the next step we merge the detected nearest risk profile with institutional settings and produce the autocompleted institutional risk profile.
EVALUATION
The goal of this evaluation was to leverage the domain expert knowledge base for detection of the nearest risk profile as described in the workflow for autocompletion of a user risk profile (see Fig. 2 ), pointing out potential risks relevant for Situation Awareness and exploitation of aggregated data for visualisation of risk factor coherences. This process is described in the risk factor visualization workflow (see Fig. 1 ).
Hypothesis and Evaluation Methods of the Risk Factor Analysis
The hypothesis is that similar risk factor profiles automatically aggregated from the domain expert knowledge base are located close to each other in the plot for a particular dimension. Therefore, a cyber analyst can easily detect alternative risk factor profiles with particular features for a specific task. Our approach should give an organisation a base of information that helps to determine an alternative risk profile with the required feature set. This decision should be the best choice for the organisation's Situation Awareness infrastructure. The employment of data mining techniques facilitates this task for a cyber analyst by performing complex calculations and comparisons. In all scenarios (see section 4.3), we performed the sample risk profile calculation for different use cases of Situational Awareness. The hypothesis is that a cyber analyst will define some of the most important risk factors and apply them as an input to the data mining tool. The output of the tool should be the given input accomplished with risk factor settings for the remaining risk factors from the nearest expert risk profile. The calculated profile then supports the decision making (e.g. file format selection) for the critical infrastructure configuration and triggers required for Situational Awareness actions.
Each evaluation scenario addresses the visualisation of risk factor dimensions. The hypothesis is that visualisation of particular risk factor dimensions will facilitate and speed up endangerment analysis and demonstrate a level of agreement between important risk factors. Thus, a cyber analyst can adjust required risk factor settings in order to reduce SA risks. We evaluated different risk profile dimensions for the selected risk factors.
Evaluation Data Set
The basis for the risk metrics calculation was provided through two exploratory studies organised by Heather Ryan (Ryan, 2014) , in which 170 digital preservation experts evaluated thirty one file format endangerment factors (see Table 1). Table 1 represents the expert profiles from the dataset from the file format survey data. In the survey, digital preservation experts rated 31 risk factors on a scale of 1 to 5. Where 1 stands for the extremely important impact of the risk factor and 5 for the low impact. We interpreted the experts ratings of the endangerment factors as levels of risk associated with each factor. The risk estimation ratings from the trusted digital preservation experts were evaluated for each of these factors based on their knowledge, experience and expertise. The columns to the right of the Risk Factor column present first five expert risk profiles out the 170 participants, whereas the number marks an expert index, e.g. E1 for "Expert 1".
For evaluation purposes well known risk factors were selected and each risk factor was graded in the range from 1 (high impact on preservation risk) to 5 (low impact on preservation risk).
For evaluation of the modified standard score in the visualisation sample four selected expert profiles are used (see Table 2 ). These manually aggregated metrics were used as an input data by the tool for visualisation and analysis of risk factor coherences.
Experimental Results and Interpretation
One of the main information source for SA are log files. In the first scenario we investigate risk factors that are important to secure rendering and accessibility of these data (see Table 2 ). The columns to the right of the "Risk Factor" column present four use case risk profiles, whereas the number marks a use case index. In the second scenario, we consider a use case, where a format should be selected to create a backup in case of attack, or to restore data after cleaning and new installation. The third use case is intended for graphical data e.g. maps or images and the selection of associated file formats e.g. "GIF" or "PNG". Important risk factors here are "Rendering Software Availability" and "Storage Space". We focus the use case description on this scenario. The fourth scenario is about decisions for instructions format e.g. "PDF" and for the documentation format e.g. "DOC".
The experimental results are presented in Table  3 that shows the institutional, nearest expert, and merged risk profiles for the graphical use case, calculated by the modified standard score. The associated original values for the expert risk profiles presented in column "Inst" can be found in the Table 2 in the column "UC3" and values presented in the "Expert" column is one of the 170 expert risk profiles. Additional risk profiles are presented in the Table 1 .
The experimental results are visualized in Figure  3 according to the graphics use case. The institutional settings for risk factors are flagged by the green circles.
In the calculated log file use case, the maximal cosine similarity 0.584 was found for the anonymized expert profile with index 79. This expert profile points cyber analyst attention to additional important risk factors, such as "Developer/Corporate Support", "Le- E1  E2  E3  E4  E5  Availability Online  2  2  3  2  2  Backward Compatibility  1  1  2  1  1  Community Support  2  1  2  2  2  Complexity  1  2  2  3  2  Compression  3  4  2  2  2  Cost  2  1 
gal Restrictions", "Metadata Support", "Value" and "Viruses". This should trigger the required SA actions to reduce these risks. For example, ensure that the cyber analyst has software developer contact data, verify that there is sufficient level of access rights for the analyst's role, review licenses expiration date, examine how to identify existing formats, etc.
For the backup use case the best match 0.587 was found for the anonymized expert profile with index 36. This expert profile directs the cyber analyst's attention to additional important risk factors, such as "Availability Online", "Community Support", "Cost", "Error Tolerance", "Geographical Spread", "Legal Restrictions", "Standardization", "Ubiquity" and "Value". This indicates that the cyber analyst should determine that there is enough free space for the backup in the storage, consider what should be included in the backup, confirm that the backup data is renderable and confirm that possible errors will not compromise the backup. It is obvious that not all suggested risk factors are applicable for particular case. For example, "Geographical Spread" might not be necessarily important in the SA domain. In this case cyber analyst can adjust related risk factor according to his institution requirements. Suggested risk factors provide an idea about what should be considered in the decison making process.
In the calculated graphics use case, the maximal cosine similarity 0.484 was computed for the anonymized expert profile with index 9. This expert profile (see Figure 3 ) considers additional important risk factors, such as "Backward Compatibility", "Compression", "Error Tolerance", "Forward Compatibility", "Metadata Support" and "Third Party Support". This indicates that the cyber analyst should review selected format documentation to estimate the complexity and forward/backward compatibility of the format. The goal here to ensure image renderability. For the documentation use case the best match 0.586 was calculated for the anonymized expert profile with index 54. This expert profile suggests additional important risk factors, such as "Backward Compatibility", "Community Support", "Developer/Corporate Support", "Error Tolerance", "Meta- data Support", "Value" and "Viruses". This indicates that the cyber analyst should examine existing documentation and instructions for renderability. Figure 3 shows a visualisation of the values from associated Table 3 . These plot demonstrate the relation between two selected expert setting vectors for the 31 evaluated risk factors on the X axis. The associated risk factor labels are presented in the Table 2 . The Y axis is range of the risk factor raitings. Figure  shows that the selected expert profiles demonstrate good agreement with institutional profile.
Graphics Risk Profile
This approach should support the definition of institutional policies for SA risk calculation. This knowledge about risks can reduce endangerment level of a digital data by providing the cyber analyst with an opportunity to ameliorate potential issues before they pose a more substantial threat. Employing the provided algorithm the cyber analyst can either select between predefined expert settings or estimate important risk factors by themself and find the most similar expert profile for the definition of remaining values.
In order to acquire more specific information about a particular file format the File Format Metadata Aggregator (FFMA) tool (Graf and Gordea, 2012 ) is employed.
These results demonstrate that a semi-automatic approach for risk factor visualisation is very effective and it is a signicant improvement compared with manual analysis for planning and validation of design for critical infrastructure. Resulting actions of the pre-sented analysis tool may be validation, checking or updating of the software.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented an approach for the easy creation of an institutional risk profile in Situational Awareness. Models employed in digital preservation domain we apply for analysis in cyber SA field.
The main contribution of this work is the employment of data mining techniques to support risk factors set up with a few of the most important values for a particular institution. The resulting risk profile is used to support cyber analysts with semi-automatic estimation of endangerment level for file formats.
The presented method employs a domain expert knowledge base collected through a survey to detect Situational Awareness risks for particular institutions.
Another contribution is support for the visualisation and analysis of risk factors. To facilitate easier decision-making, the collected information about the risk factors is presented as a multidimensional vector. The proposed methods improve the interpretability of risk factor information and the quality of the Situational Awareness process.
We make use of the modified standard score data mining method to analyse the collected data, and the cosine similarity calculation to compare risk profiles.
In the evaluation section, different risk factor dimensions are exposed. The presented plots demonstrate coherences in risk factors and help solve practical Situational Awareness issues. Using the developed approach and adjusting input data, cyber analysts have the ability to choose the appropriate risk factor setting for digital preservation planning in their institution.
The presented approach is designed to facilitate decision making for the Situational Awareness using domain expert knowledge. As future work we plan to increase the amount and quality of collected expert information and to extend the tool with additional visualisation scenarios.
